Asian ‘Developmental’ States: Lessons for Africa

Oscar Edoror UBHENİN* & Joseph Nwokpoku EDEH**

Abstract
Perhaps the most destructive aspects of African governance are found in economic mismanagement. African states’ interventions in the pre-adjustment era turned out to be terribly bad both in agriculture and in industry. This is in stark contrast with the extraordinary success of the ‘developmental’ states of East and Southeast Asia. While the latter pursued a political strategy of rising living standards, achieved through prioritizing growth, productivity, competitiveness and human capital investment, the former sought to manage political competition through distribution of state consumption. Available literature, notwithstanding, no systematic attempt has been made to investigate how the Asian ‘developmental’ states can reasonably factor into the solution to Africa’s ‘development woes’. Based upon review of published literature, reports and articles, this article argues, amongst others, that lack of strong bureaucracy is responsible for Africa’s ‘dysfunctional’ state. As a result, it has been difficult for the continent to transit to a ‘developmental’ state.

Keywords: Africa, Asia, developmental state, governance, poverty reduction, strong bureaucracy

Asya’nın Gelişmekte Olan Devletleri: Afrika İçin Dersler

Özet
(1) Introduction

With the benefit of hindsight, what processes shaped the Asian ‘developmental’ states and what can be learnt to address Africa’s ‘development woes’? The acclaimed uniqueness of Asia is corroborated by the convincing evidence of its nature, formation, and practice, which are significantly affected by its surrounding, social, economic, political and cultural contexts that are different from western societies where the dominant global models of governance originated. Despite its negative assessment regarding elitism, waste, efficiency, cronyism, corruption, and unresponsiveness, the Asian uniqueness has often been admired for making rapid socio-economic progress, resolving severe economic crisis, and enhancing national economic competitiveness in East and Southeast Asia.¹

For decades, poor people have been primarily found in Asia and Africa, thus: South Asia (45 percent), sub-Saharan Africa (24 percent) and East Asia (22 percent). But the highest percentage of population in poverty and its greatest depth is found in Africa.² Regarding the countries of East Asia, the proportion of poor population fell from 57 percent to 21 percent, “and the number of people in poverty fell from 717 million to 346 million.”³ Yet there have been changes since these more-than-a-decade old data. Currently, East Asia and Pacific region plays host to 16.8 percent (316 million)


³ Ibid, p.17.
out of total population (1,884 million) living on $1.25 a day. South Asia has 40.4 percent (596 million) out of total population (1,476 million) living on $1.25 a day. Europe and Central Asia have 0.04 percent (17 million) out of total population (473 million). Sadly, the figure is much higher for sub-Saharan Africa with 50.9 percent (388 million out of total population (763 million). Table 1 illustrates the current population of poor people by regions of the world.

Table 1: Poor people by regions of the world (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% in $1.25 a day poverty</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Pop. in $1 a day poverty (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific Latin America and</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Caribbean</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia Middle East and</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source

Instructively, East Asia had its own financial crisis, and varied country experiences as well as between periods. But the region succeeded because of reported high levels of savings and investment and efficient resource utilization. Other attributes of the East Asian states include deliberate redistribution of assets, including land reform, liberalization of agricultural markets, aggressive pursuit of export opportunities, and non-interference in management of the economy by politicians. In sum, the developmental states of East Asia succeeded by reason of substantial social and economic goals that would guide the process. Thus the public goods and services are delivered with ‘managerial effectiveness’, ‘technocratic efficiency’, and ‘streamlined procedures’.

Among others, the Asian public administration, particularly the civil service, is perceived as a rapid development enabler. In stark contrast with

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the extraordinary success of the Asian ‘developmental states’, the most destructive aspects of African governance can be located in the mismanagement of the economy. While the former pursued a political strategy of rising living standards, achieved by prioritizing growth, productivity, competitiveness and human capital investment, the latter sought to manage political competition through distribution of state consumption. Indeed, African states’ interventions in the pre-adjustment era turned out to be terribly bad both in agriculture and in industry. Yet “the overwhelming perceptions of Africa among outsiders come from the pictures of famine, disease, coups, war, genocide and fly-blown poverty that fill Western television screens.”

It is therefore important to thoroughly examine the processes that shape the Asian developmental states and determine how Africa’s development woes can be addressed through such enterprise. This article is based on a review of secondary data. Primary sources of data, such as the interviews and focus group could be used to produce data and insights for the analysis but there are constraints. Despite the shortcomings, the authors were optimistic that they would not be sufficient to derail the purpose of the study, particularly with the search for academic journals, technical papers, published reports and articles. In order to give some empirical content to the analysis, the case of Nigeria was illustrated. The choice of Nigeria as an empirical unit of analysis also arises from being one of the three largest non-developmental states with low ‘literacy’ and ‘life expectancy’ rates in the 2006 Human Development Report of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Other countries were India and Pakistan, but these have better performances while Nigeria lags behind, occupying the 153rd position overall in the 2012 HDI.

Table 2 above illustrates selected human development index (HDI) for India, Nigeria and Pakistan. To the extent that this article will occupy a unique niche in the literature on the subject, efforts are made to extract points of relevance to other parts of Africa and non-Asian contexts.

**Table 2: Selected HDI for India, Nigeria and Pakistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.602 (127th)</td>
<td>0.453 (158th)</td>
<td>0.527 (135th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.611 (126th)</td>
<td>0.448 (159th)</td>
<td>0.539 (134th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.619 (128th)</td>
<td>0.470 (158th)</td>
<td>0.551 (136th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.612 (134th)</td>
<td>0.511 (158th)</td>
<td>0.572 (141st)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.519 (119th)</td>
<td>0.423 (142nd)</td>
<td>0.490 (125th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.547 (134th)</td>
<td>0.459 (156th)</td>
<td>0.504 (145th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.554 (136th)</td>
<td>0.471 (153rd)</td>
<td>0.515 (146th)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled from various editions of UNDP’s Human Development Report.

(2) Concept of the State

Weber’s\(^{17}\) conception is usually the departure point for defining the state. Evans\(^{18}\) recalls Weber’s definition of the state as a compulsory association claiming control over territories and the people within them. The state has the capacity to monopolize the use of physical force. The state, in Routley’s words, is a “useful shorthand for a set of processes and institutions which act as a form of domination or authority that produces particular sets of

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outcomes – in this case developmental ones”^{19}, which are growth, improved livelihoods and legitimacy. The state is roughly an institution for achieving socio-economic and political development, including human wellbeing. The state is the supplier of essential goods and services, such as maintenance of law, as well as an enabling environment for peace and stability. Embedded in the analysis of the state is establishing the separation between the ruler and administrative institutions. In Osumah’s^{20} views, the extent to which the state is able to fulfill its obligations towards the citizens has a linkage with its legitimacy. However, there are variations in time and space regarding the state capability, and that of its institutions, to perform functions and fulfill rules and obligations.^{21} Partly, as a result of successful post-war reconstruction of Europe and the Soviet dirigisme, the 1940s and 1950s were dominated by developing countries’ involvement in structural transformation and improved welfare.^{22} This reinforces the state’s provision of basic social services, such as education, health and housing. The framework of the state enables the mutual respect, group cooperation, as well as predation and exploitation. However, these ‘progressive elements’ are usually accompanied by repressive political regimes that deliberately exclude population segments.

Ghani and Lockhart^{23} have identified ten key functions of the state that would produce a clustering effect. These are: the rule of law, a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, administrative control, sound management of public finance, investment in human capital, creation of citizen’s rights through social policy, provision of infrastructure services, formation of market, management of public assets, and effective public borrowing. There are variations in state intervention in the economy. By orientation, a state is either ‘regulatory’ or ‘developmental’. In United States (US), it is a regulatory orientation, because “the state concerns itself with the forms and procedures of economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive matters.”^{24} But the US policy of leaving

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^{22} Ibid.


the forces of demand and supply to move freely has been blamed for the 'made-in-the-North' economic crisis that surpassed first and second oil shocks of the 1970s, the 2000 'dot-com' bust, and the 9/11 terrorist attack, among others. In Japan, the state has a developmental orientation. The post-war Japanese economic ‘miracle’ has been attributed to government policies that were consciously and consistently formulated since the 1920s. The Japanese state prioritized its economic development for well-over 50 years, to address the challenges of depression, war and war fighting, post war reconstruction, and dependence on the US aid.

For Africa, the post-colonial state has been variously described as ‘weak’, ‘lame or crippled’, ‘irrelevant’, ‘failing’, ‘collapsing’, ‘shadow’, ‘fragile’, and ‘dysfunctional’. The ‘dysfunctional’ state arises from failure to regulate, or develop, or provide welfare services and equality, among others. In Nigeria’s case, the ‘dysfunctional state’ has recently been approximated to a ‘developmental failure’, due to the scope and persistence of economic stagnation, endemic corruption, mass poverty, political instability, social conflict, and weak institutions. The leaders’ preferred

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27 Johnson, 1999a, Op cit.
28 See Osumah, Op cit, p.113, for a larger part of the literature describing the post-colonial African state.
36 Ibid.
developmental aspirations, notwithstanding, much of the three decades’ US$500 billion earnings from petroleum exports have been ‘prodigiously’ expended on infrastructure, production and social services.\textsuperscript{38} Once a large net exporter of food, Nigeria now imports food to keep up with rapid population growth. A 2007 report put the economically active population of Nigeria at 67.9 per cent (48.9 percent female and 87.5 percent male). Increased population in the country’s urban centres also leads to huge challenges of administrative paralysis, food and social insecurity, inflation, joblessness, as well as shortages in housing and supporting infrastructures that engender a regime of human flight in the country.\textsuperscript{39}

Perhaps demographic transitions and globalization trends prevent the Nigerian state from furthering the fundamental objectives and directive principles of states policy as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution.\textsuperscript{40} Subsection 2(b) of section 14 of the constitution states that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.” In subsection 1(b) of section 16, the state is to “control the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity.” In subsection 3(f) of section 17, the state is to ensure that “children, young persons and the aged are protected against any exploitation whatsoever, and against moral and material neglect.” And in subsection 3(g) of section 17, “provision is made for public assistance in deserving cases or other conditions of need.” Regardless of its enforceability or ‘justiceability’ challenge, the Nigerian Constitution demonstrates that primarily, government is preoccupied with “the promotion of the general welfare and happiness of the people within its jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{41}

(3) Concept of Development

Conceptually, development concerns justice, opportunities and welfare of members of a given society or a particular social group, especially the poor and marginalized, shaped by internal and external processes. The foun-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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The rationale for ‘development’ centres on modernization as both subject and object. It covers the normative issues of material improvements in welfare, justice and opportunities for societies and groups to engage in political and economic process of its occurrence. Development occurs when there is less prevalence of maternal and child mortality, arising from preventable causes, arising from perhaps access to modern science-based medical services and public health measures. The ‘new ethics of development’ requires performance effectiveness, good governance enhancement, rule of law building, service delivery improvement, establishing social justice sustainable environment. These are the hallmarks of Woolcock’s ‘modernization without modernization theory’, that is, achieving “transformation in rules systems, but with an emphasis on grounding processes of reform in local contextual realities and principles of equity, rather than requiring rapid, single-step transitions to a predetermined end state.”

Regarding the acceptance of modernization theory across the spectrum of political systems, Woolcock alluded to capitalism for structural adjustment and ‘shock therapy’, socialism, such as China’s ‘great leap forward’ and Tanzania’s ‘villagization’, commonly called Ujamaa, meaning family. Ujamaa was built on the principles of village sharing that enabled family members to share their resources. Mwalimu, the Swahili word for teacher, as Nyerere chose to be called, hoped this quality of extended family, concerned with care for one another, would characterize African socialism, permeated with ‘African conviviality’. Other examples of Africa political philosophy that are “human-centred and couched in the ideology of ‘welfarism’ or better still ‘socialism’ are Kaunda’s ‘humanism’, Nkrumah’s ‘consciencism’, Senghor’s ‘negritude’, and Awolowo’s ‘democratic socialism’. Since the beginning of time, development has been symbolized by growth and expansion: to achieve a better life for the family, the tribe and the nation. Developing countries are in search of the ‘mysterious trigger’, or the ‘take-off trigger’ that would enable their evasion from the ‘poverty trap’, usually, through mass employment, guaranteed minimum income and social protection. Successful attainment of these goals compels emulation of earlier industrialized societies, with the

support of well-intentioned development plans and international financial assistance. Technical assistance followed the realization that money alone cannot bring about economic development, alluding to the much-touted ‘Washington Consensus’ as one of the processes that formed the catalyst for the emergence of ‘good governance’.45

(4) The ‘Developmental’ State

The term ‘developmental’ state has been frequently used to describe state-led policies and institutions that engendered rapid economic growth in Asian countries. The idea of the ‘capitalist developmental state’ was first introduced into the literature by Johnson’s seminal work on the history of modern Japanese industrial policy. Johnson was interested in going beyond the contrast between the American and Soviet economies. He sought to draw attention to the differences between the capitalist economies of the US and Britain, on the one hand, and Japan and its emulators elsewhere in East Asia on the other. He was also interested in the rare histories of bureaucracies, particularly how it reasonably factored into the Japanese state economic growth. Apart from the time-frame of 50 years, Johnson considered his work to be original for two reasons: the identification of often overlooked bureaucrats as key political actors, and the detailed analysis of the workings of an effective state bureaucracy. For “in the Japanese ‘developmental’ state, the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule.”47 At the time of Johnson’s writing, Japanese emergence as the most successful economy among the OECD countries was a wonder of sort because it never believed in the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. Johnson’s thoughts on the ‘developmental state’ after ‘MITI and the Japanese Miracle’ were harmonized in a collection of his essay.48

Japanese state bureaucrats were more ‘democratic’ than the military and/or ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ that pervaded the other East Asian states, but the beauty in authoritarianism is that the population can be mobilized to achieve economic development using market forces. There is a difference between Johnson’s developmental state and Weberian bureau-

46 Johnson, 1982, Ibid.
47 Johnson, 1999a, Op cit, p.50.
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bureaucracy, with its “‘holy trinity’ of traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic sources of authority.” The source of authority for a developmental state is rather revolutionary; it is the authority of a people committed to social, political and economic transformation. A ‘developmental’ state has authority because of the state’s achievement, rather than how it emerged is the source of legitimacy.

Within the developmental state paradigm, the patterns of interaction between the official state bureaucracy and ‘privately’ owned and managed businesses are controversially apt. Johnson captures ‘self-control’, ‘state control’, and ‘public-private cooperation’. By self-control, private cartels enjoy delegated responsibility or control over each industry, run by members of cartels in response to incentives of the state. Self-control engenders ‘monopoly capitalism’, marred by violent protests by workers. State control refers to the reduction of private cartels, private ownership, private labour organizations, and private control associations by the state institutions. State control engenders ‘bureaucratism’ and misallocation or resources. Public-private cooperation emerged in Japan after 1952, when both private and public sectors reconciled with each other and agreed upon management schemes, thereby avoiding undue emphasis on either private profit or the state’s socialization of wealth. In a ‘developmental’ state, there is a mutually beneficial relationship between state officials and civilian enterprise managers. The purpose is to achieve economic development. That is, neither the state nor the private sector prevails over the other. The managers respond to incentives and disincentives of the state as a ‘catalytic’ agency. A combination of both would produce economic development ‘miracles’.

There are two basic models of the developmental state: the ‘repressive’ and the ‘democratic’. The repressive, autocratic developmental states are Republic of Korea, and Taiwan Province of China. Expectedly, the democratic developmental state would cure the ‘unprogressive elements’ of repression and exclusion of the autocratic regime found in the autocratic developmental state. Examples include Botswana and Singapore (with a dominant single party). For Mauritius, it is rather a ‘shifting condition’. Evans has also gone beyond the two formulations to anchor his analysis on Sen’s capability approach, suggesting that the developmental state can

49 Ibid, p.53.
50 Ibid.
51 Leftwich, Op cit, p.16.
focus on individual capabilities, not economic gains. Beyond the autocratic, democratic and capability models, Routley designed a schematic of states considered to be developmental. The first considerations are the ‘big three’ comprising Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The attributes of the ‘big three’ are industrial based economy, high economic growth rates, professional bureaucracy, and autonomous state bureaucracy. The considerations, with more issues with corruption, but not ‘predatory’ are the ‘South Asian Developmental States’, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The attributes of these states include economic growth more foreign direct investment-based based than the Northeast Asian ‘big three’, good economic growth rates, and less autonomous bureaucracy than the big three.

The third lone consideration is Botswana, described as a rare case of ‘natural resource developmentalism’. Its attributes include good economic growth rates, natural resource based economy, and democratic (de facto one party state). The fourth considerations are the ‘social democratic developmental states’, comprising Chile, Costa Rica (Kerala), and Mauritius. Their attributes are reasonable economic growth rates, democratic, and state investment in social protection, health and education. The fifth set of considerations is ‘developmental patrimonialism’, comprising Côte d’Ivoire (1960-1975), Malawi (1964-78), Kenya (1965-75), Tanzania (1967-1978), and Rwanda (2000-2010). Their attributes are good growth rates, patrimonialism, centralized rents, developmental outcomes, and relatively autonomous civil service. The sixth consideration is ‘aspirational developmental states’, comprising Ethiopia and South Africa. These states are noted with political actors – the President (in the case of Ethiopia) and African National Congress (in the case of South Africa) – who state an intention to create a developmental state. Finally, China appears as a loner because of its recent economic credentials of good growth rates; state investment in infrastructure, education and health; and sustained economic growth. Region-wise, South Asia houses Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China. Southeast Asia plays host to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Africa is home to Botswana and Mauritius. Finland is an extremely educative example located in Europe.

A developmental state is associated with a capable autonomous (embedded) bureaucracy. It is development-oriented political leadership. There is a close, usually mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between pilot state agencies and key industrial capitalists. In Japan, the Ministry of

53 Routley, Op cit.
International Trade Investment (MITI) served as a pilot agency. Republic of Korea had Economic Policy Board (EPB), Singapore had the Economic Development Board (EDB), Botswana had the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), and Finland’s Economic Council is also recorded. A developmental state has a policy-induced economic growth. There are developmental structure, including state capacity and leadership/vision for performing developmental roles. “A developmental state has sufficient state capacity to be effective in targeted areas and has a developmental vision such that it chooses to use this capacity to work towards economic development.”\(^{54}\) Put differently,\(^ {55}\) a developmental state is mostly interested in economic development. It has the capability to develop effective instruments to achieve the onerous goal of economic development. Its effective institutions are formal, and well-functioning, weaving of formal and informal networks among citizens and officials, and utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production. It establishes an institutional framework, providing law and order, effectiveness in administration of justice, as well as peaceful resolution of conflicts; fosters rights to own property, enhances appropriate investments in infrastructure, and ultimately advances human development. It is committed to influencing the pace and direction of economic development, as opposed to the influence (unrestricted) of the forces of the market to allocate economic resources. It is able to formulate and implement policies and program in a manner that is otherwise authoritative, credible, legitimate and binding.

That is, the developmental state mobilizes societal resources to achieve development goals. Apart from elite commitment, an essential character of the developmental state is political settlement, involving implicit agreements with segments of the private sector. These ‘rules of the game’ constitute a core area of agreements among the elites. Political settlements turn the politicians’ attention away from rentier politics because of the expected benefits in state building efforts.\(^ {56}\) The successful ‘developmental’ states of East Asia and Southeast Asia operated without the western best practices of good governance. But considerations have lately been given to the ‘failed’ developmental states, predicated upon a definition “not by their successes but by their commitment to a widely held ambition – a hegemonic ideology – of development.”\(^ {57}\) Internal instability, external threats

\(^{54}\) Ibid, p.9.


\(^{56}\) Routley, Op cit.

and military backing contribute to the emerging of the developmental state. Developmental states are quick at developing effective bureaucracies, well-trained and highly competitive regarding entry and promotion. At the heart of each ‘developmental state’ is the location of bureaucracies, which are close to and protected by the executive power and authority. Developmental states are able to build and “maintain powerful, competent and insulated specialist economic bureaucracies, highly trained and largely insulated from the cloying demands of special interests, avoiding the main ‘capture’ by such interests.”

(5) Poverty Dimensions

The conception of poverty is usually from three broad strands, namely: the prosaic money-centric approach, the UN promoted approach, and the civil society perspective. The prosaic money-centric approach symbolizes the official donors’ definition of poverty “based on the concept of low income per capita or low consumption through Living Standard Measurement Survey.” The UN and aid promoted concept of human development, as an alternative approach, is based on the seminal ideals of Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen on the capabilities’ realizations from the different forms of entitlement. The concern for food ‘entitlements’ and ‘undernutrition’, and their linkages with poverty and inequalities reached its heights during the mid-1980s, a period of terrible famine in the Horn of Africa – “few can forget the shocking scenes in Ethiopia at that time.” Sen is noted for his ground-breaking work on what constitutes ‘entitlements’ in debates on food security. He also co-directed one of the very first WIDER research themes, and one of the best known, ‘Hunger and poverty: The poorest billion’, with Jean Dreze, which resulted in a three volume study, The Political Economy of Hunger, “a classic analysis of an extraordinary paradox: in a world of food surpluses and satiety, hunger kills millions more people each year than wars or political repression.”

Sen, through his work, revolutionized the view that food insecurity was simply a supply problem. He also debunked the long-held view that sudden drop in food availability would lead to acute emergencies and/or famines. In Sen’s views, “a collapse in entitlements can lead to famines or food security crisis even in the absence of an overall food shortage” and “starvation is a matter of some people not having enough food to eat, and not a matter of there being not enough food to eat.”64 Entitlements are, therefore, kinds of lawful access to food, including production – direct production or gathering of food, trade – including buying and selling food, selling labour and other goods in order to buy food, and transfers – from state to individual or household, between or among individuals.65 Sen’s conception goes beyond income levels to its associated conditions of health and education, and then to the ‘unfreedoms’, such as tyranny or bad treatments by the state as well as lack of participation of the poor in decisions.66 Lastly, the civil society (comprising non-governmental organizations and the academia) emphasizes ‘vulnerability’ as a core element in poverty definition. Vulnerability describes specific conditions that place people at risk of ill-health, loss of productive assets, loss of ability to work, malnutrition or starvation. In classical terms, vulnerability suggests “exposure to risks and the inability to cope with the consequences of those risks.”67 In its simplest form, it is the sensitivity to livelihood shocks such as crop failure, droughts, floods, illness, job loss, and economic downturns.68

But the shift in conceptualization of vulnerability has de-emphasized outcomes, such as malnutrition and starvation, and focused more on hazards or causal factors, such drought and flooding. In analyzing the risk of a negative outcome regarding the likelihood of a given hazard in combination with the level of exposure of a given group to that hazard and the group’s capacity to deal with the consequences, the formulation is expressed as: $R = f(H, V)$, where: ‘$R$’ is risk of a negative outcome, such as food insecurity; ‘$H$’ is hazards, such as drought; and ‘$V$’ is the level of exposure to the hazard and ability to cope with its consequences.69 From the perspective of Singh’s work, there is a multidimensional approach to

65 Ibid.
67 Maxwell, Sadler, Sim, Mutoni, Egan and Webster, *Op cit*, p.12.
69 Maxwell, Sadler, Sim, Mutoni, Egan and Webster, *Op cit*. 
poverty definition, encompassing all three core elements, namely: lack of opportunity, insecurity, and vulnerability and powerlessness. Therefore, poverty is considered to be a deprivation of basic capabilities. The capabilities approach brings about changes in measurement criterion in poverty assessments, and policy options or choices in poverty alleviation enterprise. The multidisciplinary approach directs attention to the strengthening of individuals’ and households’ capabilities, to enable them participate in efforts and initiatives to improve their own welfare and livelihoods. This latter approach also focuses on external political and social constraints to the poor: “those who live below the poverty line.”

Perhaps the precarious living conditions in Nigeria expose most people to vulnerability, as evidenced in life expectancy of about 55. The Nigerian government has attempted to deal with vulnerability and risks of both poor and non-poor people at different stages of life cycle, from birth to old age. The various reforms and initiatives in this direction are encapsulated in pension reform, health insurance, virtual poverty funds, micro-credit, and conditional cash transfer (CCT). In 2012 alone, the federal government committed N5 billion to the CCT to alleviate poverty and accelerate progress towards the MDGs. The fund was drawn from the Debt Relief Grants (DRGs), the outcome of an agreement reached in October 2005 by the Paris Club of creditor-nations to cancel $18 billion (N3.96 trillion) out of Nigeria’s indebtedness of some $30 billion to the Club. Nigeria pledged to commit the savings to finance pro-poor projects in further of the MDGs targets in the country. The savings approximates to N100 billion ($757 million) annually and spent on projects in key sectors, such as health, education, power supply, water resources, housing and agriculture.

(6) The Theory: Developmental Patrimonialism

A paper such as this may be confusing when it is not anchored on current debates in the social science literature. To situate this paper within an appropriate framework, therefore, it is imperative to analyze a regi-

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70 Singh, Op cit, p.3.
73 Efe Ebelo, FG commits N5b to alleviate poverty, Daily Independent, Tuesday, 16 October, 2012, p.22
me type that accomplishes development goals without conforming to the much-touted ‘good governance’ orthodoxy\textsuperscript{75} namely: the absence of clientelism, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, discrimination, and the ‘capture’ of administrative agencies by the interest groups that they are meant to regulate. This is the hallmark of developmental patrimonialism. Africa experiences the diversion of administrative energies into patronage, and rent-seeking\textsuperscript{76}, perhaps because distributions of benefits for all powerful groups cannot be produced by formal institutions alone.\textsuperscript{77}

For decades, the general mode of African states has been clientelist and most practices fall into what Olivier de Sardan calls the ‘informal realm’.\textsuperscript{78} On the basis of this ‘real governance’, which is often expressed in the concepts of neopatrimonialism, clientelism and informality, it has been suggested that “contemporary politics in Africa is best understood as the exercise of neopatrimonial power”, “hybrid political systems in which customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions.”\textsuperscript{79} However, these claims have been seriously criticized in the literature because neopatrimonialism does not provide an adequate basis for understanding politics and administration. Perhaps Theobald\textsuperscript{80} already envisaged this when he warned against the danger of losing its analytical utility in the ‘catch-all’ concept.\textsuperscript{81}

There is a huge gap in blending modern bureaucratic and more personalistic and clientelist forms of authority, and this is what Crook’s\textsuperscript{82} developmental patrimonialism seeks to fill. This theory depicts a sub-type of neo-patrimonial regime in which there is centralized management of


\textsuperscript{78} Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Researching the Practical Norms of Real Governance in Africa, APPP Discussion Paper, no.5, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008, December.


\textsuperscript{81} Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All Concept, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Papers, no.16, 2006.

main economic ‘rents’ in support of a long-term vision. The ruling elite had the disposition and capacity to use rents productively to enlarge the national economic pie, rather than obtaining the largest slices from it in the short term. In addition, key elements of the state technocracy are subjected to corporate disciplines. Anti-graft efforts are able to become more than a charade. And serious efforts can be made to address the difficult collective action problems that prevent improvements in public-sector performance. Developmental patrimonialism, therefore, feeds into the analysis of ‘working with the grain’ and ‘best fit’ approach to governance for development, which interrogates the “ideological forces, vested interests and political pressures that promote institutional mimicry at global and country levels.” Working with the grain requires building on existing institutional arrangements that have recognizable benefits. Rather than sweep aside pre-existing institutions regardless of their ability to contribute they should be treated as a potential resource for reforms that improve development outcomes. Instructively, approaches that are imported from a broad concept of good practice may not work unless there is a serious effort to adapt them to local circumstances, embedded in traditions and motivating forces of family, ethnicity and religion.

This theory reinforces the debates on policy learning and transfer processes, which received considerable academic attention in the last decade, including how people learn and under what circumstances policy transfer is possible. Interestingly, the debate is suitable for the analysis of policy learning and transfer failure in Africa when applied in the context of Moyo’s thesis that African societies face common challenges even though the continent is not one country. Moyo contrasts Zambia (10 million people 72 different dialects) with Zimbabwe (similar population but only two ethnic groups). Most African states share in the history of colonialism,
military incursion into politics, failed democracies, and violent conflicts. African states have also benefited from development aid meant for conflict resolution, social reconstruction and state building, though with contestable impact.

(7) The Asian Context

Asia represents the world’s largest and most populous continent, primarily located in the eastern and northern hemispheres, and covering 8.7 percent of the Earth’s total surface and comprising 30 percent of its land area. Asia is bounded on the east by the Pacific Ocean, on the south by the Indian Ocean and on the north by the Arctic Ocean. It has approximately 4.3 billion people, and plays host to 60 percent of the world’s current human population. The success of the East and Southeast Asian countries is currently a reference point for the analysis of ‘developmental’ states, largely because of its application of state activism towards economic and social infrastructure and support services for the peasantry masses, with striking features embedded in more than three decades of ‘unusually rapid economic growth’. The Asian states lack comprehensive state bureaucracies but the protected ‘islands of efficiencies’, such as planning ministries and agricultural agencies, receive inputs from visionary state officials. Corruption has not been eliminated, but only combined at some level to ensure the protection of certain investment climate from fatal damage.

In some cases, development is pushed by corruption. The capitalist developmental states of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan emulated Japan to promote growth in the region. Apparently to dismantle a command economy, the 1990’s, Leninist-leaning Peoples’ Republic of China also started to adapt the Japanese developmental state institutional model. In fact, the post-communist regimes were established by China and Vietnam. The 1997 economic crisis reminds of lack of a pilot agency Thailand and Indonesia, such as the Japanese Ministry of International Trade Investment that could order economic development. Korea improved on the Japanese experience. Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan were the high

clientelist regimes, wherein economic rents could be centrally managed and directed under military regimes or dominant parties. One acknowledged benefit of the ‘Asian miracle’ is substantial reduction in poverty, achieved through various improvements in agricultural sector and pro-rural policies. These improvements raised rural incomes and inspired human well-being. Indirectly, the policies assisted in the creation of an enabling environment for the industries to grow and develop.

The factors that induced the Asian developmental states have also received scholars’ attention. One issue is perceived imminent threat of rural rebellion in Southeast Asia, which was significant in the region’s high considerations for pro-poor rural policies that could reach large populations. Apart from the presence of early (or timely) emergence of small, inexpensive professionals, very efficient bureaucracies or ‘pilot bureaucratic agencies, with their prestige, legitimacy and authority, enabled the championing of politically defined and civic interest groups. Despite its embedded nature in the developmental agenda, the bureaucracies were possibly shielded from manipulation of powerful rent-seeking groups outside the state. This suggests that the Southeast Asian public administration had the capability to overcome what Toye calls the negative or abstract connotation of bureaucracy. Regardless of the prevailing corruption under difficult political regimes, these Asian states made ‘progress towards democratization’, only after substantial economic transformation had been achieved.

Some analysts are of the opinion that the distinctive attribute of authoritarianism must be repudiated because the achievement of development agenda is anchored on the principles of governance and institutions. There were also elements of colonial legacies, as evidenced in the established capable bureaucracies, such as the Japanese influence on Korea and Taiwan. In 1870, Japan “was threatened by the intrusion of western-powers in western waters and the danger of sinking economically after the second world (war).” Korea was attack by its northern neighbor. Singapore was sandwiched between Islamic Malaysia and Indonesia. “Taiwan Province of China had the People’s Republic of China glaring at it across the

91 Routley, Op cit.
94 Booth and Therkildsen, Op cit.
95 Routley, Op cit.
96 Leftwich, Op cit, p.12.
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straits. Finland was aware and had an experience of history with Russian and Soviet interventions. Internally, there was insurgency in Malaysia, and fear of insurgency in Thailand. The coalition of internal elites in these countries cohered.

The countries also witnessed concentration of power and policy continuity. Particularly, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam invested in rural development projects, ostensibly with the urgency, outreach and expediency that it required. These Southeast Asian states emerged under very challenging conditions, such as low economic development and poor credentials in democracy and human rights. Indeed, the Southeast Asian states ‘developed without any grab of democratic governance’, alluding to the ‘fetish of authoritarianism’ as a deficit feature for describing the developmental state. The irrelevant democracy can be found in Fukayama’s less emphasis on democratic regime since there are well-governed authoritarian regimes as well as mal-administered democracies. Good enough, Malaysia is a shining example to the latest Ugandan development plan. Yet, “the nature of lessons that Africa can usefully draw from Asia has not always been crystal clear.” The question then is the feasibility of developmental state in Africa, including the form and shape that it needs to assume in the continent.

(8) Africa’s ‘Original Sin’

Africa, as used in this narrative, denotes the south of the Sahara, or sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). By this delineation, there is a deliberate exclusion of countries of the north of the Sahara, which combine with the countries geographically called the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region currently dominated by an unusually high wave of protests and demonstrations. This reintroduces into debates the fundamental question of revolution and perhaps the power of street-level protests. African states have a bureaucracy that was inherited from the colonialists. The bureaucracy was established to facilitate the exploitation of African economies by the Europeans who needed agricultural products and minerals as well as markets for their finished products. In other words, the colonial civil service

97 Ibid.
was watered by the ‘greed and lucre of the European economies.\textsuperscript{101} Despite decades of reforms of the colonial heritage, the African bureaucracy is still in want. Among others, the capacity gap in African state bureaucracies is evidenced in the poor conditions of good governance.

On a cheery note, Africa has made significant progress, attributable to spread of democracy, improved policy-making, and the emergence of new political elites that cooperatively work with the donor community. But this so-called ‘progress’ has been described as ‘growth without economic transformation’. Economic activities’ diversification, livelihood improvements, land and labour productivity, and increased technological capabilities of firms and farms sum up the much desired ‘economic transformation’. Yet, “growth in itself does not pull masses out of poverty.”\textsuperscript{102} Africa lags behind other regions on many development- and governance-related issues. For Botswana and Mauritius as good examples of state-led economic development, they are “only the exceptions and not the rule in Africa.”\textsuperscript{103} With a population growth of three percent annually, Africa needs agricultural productivity to ‘put food on the family table’. Young people need to be employed in manufacturing and other industries. Public services need a doubling to enable the effective provision of education and health. Environmental protection and suitable energy practices are required and trade liberalization also suggests that Africa needs to compete successfully “to avoid complete marginalization by dynamic players such as the BRIC countries, Malaysia and Turkey.”\textsuperscript{104}

‘Original sin’, a term coined in late 1990s, refers to countries’ inability to borrow long-term through domestic, local currency bond markets.\textsuperscript{105} The world’s leading emerging markets (EMs) that have successful overcome this challenge include Brazil, China, Mexico, Russia and South Africa. Coined in 1980 by the World Bank’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation, EMs refers to “developing countries with stock markets that were beginning to demonstrate the features of the mature stock markets in industrialized countries.”\textsuperscript{106} Nellor observed that Africa’s ‘ori-
ginal sin’ was difficult to measure due to non-availability of comprehensive, reliable data on African bonds. But there is ‘good news’. International agencies, such as Africa Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have commenced the systematic gathering of data on African bonds. Available evidence suggests an overall, substantial decline in SSA’s debts “from around 100% of GDP on average during the 1990s to just over 40% in 2010.” This milestone is attributable to external debt cancellations under the 1996 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and its successor, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative of 2006.

For Africa’s most populous country, debt cancellation was a political issue, particularly since the country did not have any sustainable program at that time. Nigeria was not eligible for ‘concessional debt relief’ because the World Bank’s management had not granted an international development association status to the country at that time. In the creditor’s eyes, Nigeria was ‘debt affordable’ because her oil-rich status. The country’s unacceptably high levels of corruption consigned her to a sort of ‘reputational overhang’, and therefore gained “very little public support in OECD countries for debt cancellation.” But former visits and other sessions between the Nigerian government and the G8 finance ministers led to an unprecedented debt deal for Nigeria in June 2005, through the payment of $6.4 billion by the country, while the creditors wrote off $18 billion. By April 2006, Nigeria cleared $30 billion of debt owed to foreign creditors, a deal that was “to save the country almost $47 billion over the next 15 years.” The benefit of Nigeria’s debt cancellation can be located in Debt Relief Grants, a pledge to commit the savings from the debt cancellation to pro-poor projects. “The savings approximates to N100 billion ($757 million) annually and (are) spent on projects in key sectors, such as health, education, power supply, water resources, housing and agriculture.”

A pointer to washing away this original sin is the increase in domestic debt, which occupied approximately 40 percent of total state debt in sun-Saharan Africa. Numerous factors account for the increase in domestic debt. First, ‘improved institutions and macroeconomic policy’ encouraged the development of African bond markets. Second, there is an emer-

111 Essers and Cassimon, *Op cit*. 
ging ‘Diaspora bond’, which is in a potential class of its own, regarding international investment. Third, regulated reforms in the continent’s non-bank financial institutions, including pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds have enabled the ‘original sin redemption’. In terms of GDP, these assets are comparable to what obtains in Asia and Latin America. Fourth, the international financial institutions also act as ‘market makers’ by building and strengthening Africa’s domestic bond markets. Time not fail this study to point out the international ‘original sin’, which appears to be beyond redemption. This refers to a country’s inability to borrow from abroad in local currency.

With exceptions, namely: Nigeria and South Africa, foreign investors’ participation in local bond markets is still minimal. One might tempted to point to the ‘Diaspora bond’ as an effective mechanism of washing away the international ‘original sin’, particularly with reference to the much-touted ‘patriotic discount’, but there are reservations in terms of its practical execution. The domestic debt is encouraged because of its capacity to reduce the country’s reliance on external funds. It enables the government to mobilize domestic savings for self-funding of development. It potentially enhances government accountability to the citizenry. Perhaps to enjoy these benefits African states are now issuing bonds of five, ten and twenty years or more. A developing country like Nigeria has gone borrowing again. In March 2012, Nigeria’s total debt stock was N6.8 trillion ($44 billion). “Out of this amount, N5.96 trillion ($38.3 billion) is domestic debt while N919 billion ($5.9 billion) is external debt.” Beyond the economic implication, debt considered to “a hardware political issue in international relations; a power tool for keeping nations on their knees.”

An ‘original sin’ is the deindustrialization of Africa. Whereas industry, including modern and agro-based services, is a panacea to unemployment, poverty, and underdevelopment, Africa has lost the capacity to industrialize. Rather there is decline in manufacturing added value, as a share of the GDP since mid-1980s, because the industry has been moving out of the continent. ‘Original sin’ has also been applied to describe the persistence of inequality in Brazil, between high economic growth under

112 Ibid.
military dictatorial regime and mild growth under political democracy. de Carvalho identified slavery, latifundium and patrimonialism as Brazil’s ‘original sin’. Slavery permeated the Brazilian Christian society until 1888 when it was abolished. By ‘latifundium’, he refers to the unequal and irregular distribution of land for the purpose of cultivation. Patrimonialism, on its part, refers to the blurred distinction between public and private realms, particularly the application of “public goods for the benefit of privileged citizens” such as the ‘landed aristocrats’ and ‘colonial bureaucrats’. Sadly, Brazil’s weakly rooted democracy does not demonstrate the potential to wash away these ‘original sins’, as corruption is still very much prevalent in the society today. African states’ ruling elite, that is some kind of coalition of different elements, operate on a patron-client basis. The elite requires access to ‘rents’ in the economy to bolster “its internal relationships and by the support of crucial constituencies.”

The three principal forms of rent are natural resource rents, geopolitical (foreign aid) rents, and contrived rents (created by government intervention to change relative prices). The characteristic feature of rent is its possibility to be detached from the activity that generates it so that it can provoke political contests for its capture. Rents are therefore manipulated by political agents to determine the divergence of the economy from its optimum path. Booth and Therkildsen have cited the use of rents in different African states. The centralized economic management that led to significant economic transformation and social progress for a period during the early-independence regimes of Houphouet-Boigny’s Cote d’Ivoire, Kenyatta’s Kenya, and Banda’s Malawi did not sufficiently change their country’s long-term development routes. Questions are also being raised regarding the institutionalized leadership and rent centralization by Ethiopian and Rwandan regimes, but these two cases are illustrative of the necessary conditions for economic development to occur. A moderate case under competitive clientelism is Ghana. Examples of successful productive sectors are found in Mozambique’s sugar and Uganda’s dairy, when applied to the three important conditions of the Elites, Production

119 Booth and Therkildsen, Op cit.
and Poverty: A Comparative Analysis (EPP)'s research program. First, elite’s retention of power is dependent upon the perceived business success. A second condition is the development of a mutuality of interest between private investors and ruling politicians. Third, pockets of bureaucratic capability within the state apparatus that is able to deliver the required support and follow-up on implementation difficulties.

One potent instrument of the state for achieving economic development is the bureaucracy, and this seeks to ensure the orientation of the state towards functional and operational approaches in dealing with the citizens and communities. Like in other developing societies, one major feature that resonates in African state bureaucracy is its colonial inheritance. Yet the bureaucracy is known for its many problems, which have been well elaborated in the literature. Central to the analysis of bureaucratic problems is patronage, which focuses on the influence of political regime in hiring, firing, transfer, promotion and demotion of civil servants. Patronage captures the competition between political factions that later dominated most aspects of the national government, including the staffing and administration of public bureaucracies, thereby setting aside the era of trusteeship and/or revolutionary functionaries. In Nigeria, for example, the public service has erected a bloated apparatus of patronage. For decades, and just like governmental decisions regarding the location of industries, award of scholarships, and the building of roads, the benefits of appointment to posts in the public service are of serious consideration to the various ethnic groups, particularly the ‘ethnic watchers’ in the country. Sadly, however, provides a cover for bureaucrats shield their colleagues from apparent investigation in corrupt cases.

(9) Analysis
A necessary precursor to the emergence of a developmental state is land reform, which also provides economic freedoms to peasant farmers and small scale enterprises. This was particularly the case of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Specifically, Taiwan’s non-communist land reform provided a ceiling on land ownership, thereby significantly limiting rent-related wealth accumulation and improving agricultural productivity. Such pro-poor and pro-rural policies engendered developmental success in Southeast

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120 Fakir, *Op cit.*
122 Osumah, *Op cit.*
Asia. But in the case of Africa, it was more or less a developmental failure. If anything, sub-Saharan African states engage in ‘elitist’ agricultural policies, which dispossessed the populations to the extent that they could not utilize ‘hybrid rural-urban family strategies’. The continent lacks legitimate political order and sufficient national authority, as evidenced in attention in the global environment by neo-liberal paradigm, and the global economic crisis. Institutional capacity deficiencies are also found within the multidimensional capacity mechanisms in the continent. At political independence, the growing elites in post-colonial Africa were ‘neck-deep’ in the pursuit of personal interest. Thus, they succeeded in using the mechanism of state intervention in the economy to facilitate the accumulation of private wealth. The embedded character of the developmental states fosters the close relationship between the bureaucrats and business-people, thereby enabling the state to coordinate the private sector for enhanced growth of the economy. In a capital scarce environment the state could invest in selected strategic sectors of the economy. But in the case of Africa, even borrowed money may develop wings and fly into private pockets, suggesting that populations have to suffer the repayment of debt.

More important is the place of a strong state bureaucracy in economic development. The Japanese bureaucracy reasonably integrated itself into the state economy. In Africa, however, the bureaucracy is often over-bloated, perhaps because of the interests of state actors. In Japan, politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule. But African politicians both reign and rule at the same time, with few exceptions. Africa appears to be lacking in genuine development-oriented leadership with sustained vision of development. Africa demonstrates lack of efficient bureaucracy. SSA lacks a large, production-based private sector, arising from weak indigenous businesses. This can be illustrated by the pursuit of Nigeria’s indigenization policy intended to help weak businesses grow in the economy. SSA is known for a predatory character of the post-colonial state, evidenced in ‘state failure’, and reflected in militarized civic society, which has also been well elaborated in the literature. For “when states fail, those with power employ it to extract resources from those without power. The latter flock to those who offer them security albeit often for a price: the obligation to contribute to

123 Routley, Op cit, p.19.
their new political community, in some cases by bearing arms.” Instructively, however, the abuse of power is not the only distinctive characteristic of state failure. Were it so, it would have been difficult to differentiate it from authoritarianism. In analyzing Nigeria’s ‘developmental failure’, and instability, the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index is apt. The index is an annual ranking based on comprehensive social science methodology and triangulation as well as review of data from three primary sources. Table 3 illustrates Nigeria’s worst scoring indicators in the failed states index.

**Table 3: Nigeria’s worst scoring indicators in the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index (2011-2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank among other countries</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group grievance</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneven development</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of the state</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security apparatus</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factionalized elites</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total score</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>100.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from The Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index (2011-2013)

With a total score of 99.9, Nigeria ranked 14th in the failed states index of 2011. The country’s worst scoring indicators were ‘group grievance’ (9.6), ‘uneven development’ (9.0), ‘legitimacy of the state’ (9.0), ‘public services’ (9.0), ‘security apparatus’ (9.1), and ‘factionalized elites’ (9.5). In 2012, Nigeria retained the 14th position with a total score of 101.1. The country’s worst scoring indicators for 2012 were ‘group grievance’ (9.7), ‘uneven development’ (8.9), ‘delegitimization of the state’ (9.1), ‘public services’ (9.1), ‘security apparatus’ (9.2), and ‘factionalized elites’ (9.8). In 2013, Nigeria ranked 16th in the failed state index with a total score of 100.7 under

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127 *Ibid*.
128 Presented as ‘de-legitimization of the state’.
the ‘high alert’ sub-theme. Again, the country’s worst scoring indicators for 2013 were ‘group grievance’ (9.8), ‘uneven development’ (9.2), ‘legitimacy of the state’ (9.8), ‘public services’ (9.3), ‘security apparatus’ (9.5), and ‘fractionalized elites’ (9.4). Standing upon these ‘weak’ indicators, one can safely posit that there is eroded confidence in the Nigerian state apparatus. The depleted solidarity and sense of patriotism also arise from poor governance, thereby compelling citizens to find space in ‘ethnic’ and perhaps ‘religious’ shelters for comfort.

In addition, organized crime in Nigeria falls within the purview of ‘economic space of inclusion’, which responds to “the systematic neglect of the productive segment of the population and the failure of the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy.” In ‘exiting the state’, the Nigerian youth, entrapped in poverty, resort to various crimes including armed robbery, fake documents syndicates, human and drug trafficking, internet fraud, irregular migration to Europe and other western states, local and international prostitution, smuggling and piracy, as well as employment scam. A most recent literature identifies ‘commodified kidnapping’ as one of the available ‘exit’ options for the marginalized and excluded youth.

(10) Conclusion

From the foregoing review, one key factor in the developmental state processes is land reform, which provided economic freedom to peasants in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. In the case of Africa, it has been the promotion of elite interests through agricultural policies. Where African states borrow to procure agricultural policies, the funds ended up in private hands. Another important role was played by the unique Asian public administ-

ration. Therefore, one is tempted to conclude that the Asian ‘developmental’ states succeeded because of a ‘strong’ bureaucracy represented by the ‘pilot’ agencies.

The rediscovery of bureaucracies is emboldened by the East Asian economic miracle, attributed to powerful, well-organized bureaucracies and competent and relatively honest staff, insulated from day-to-day politics. The politicians’ reign does not overwhelm bureaucrats’ rule. Africa witnesses the phenomenon of ‘state failure’, ‘dysfunctional state’ or ‘developmental failure’, including the challenge of effective state management and sustainable economic development because it lacks ‘strong’ bureaucracies. Transiting to a ‘development state’ in Africa requires a fuller understanding of the goals of the numerous reforms initiated by the state managers. Having mutated from its ‘colonial inheritance’ for maintaining law and order, its partnership in the ‘national dominant coalition’ for policy implementation, its ‘trusted alliance’ with the military power holders, and its being ‘put in their place’, the African bureaucracy is in search of capacity to weather the circumstances emanating from policy diffusion. Finally, state leadership commitment is required to adapt future reforms with the informal realm in Africa.

138 Omoruyi, Op cit.
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